owlcreekok
April 05, 2006, 14:08
The reality of FEMA's 2005 hurricane response
This is a summary of a presentation by Tom Miner, program manager for the WA-1 Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R), given Sunday April
2 at the 2006 Communications Academy in Burien Washington. His team spent 32 days providing service during four hurricanes in 2005, beginning with Katrina. US&R and DMAT are the largest FEMA response groups.
There were seven (7) hurricanes in 2005 before Katrina, the most significant event since 2003. In just six hours, it completely devastated Mississippi. With wind gusts over 150 MPH, if it was there before the storm, it was gone afterwards. The storm surge reached up to eight (8) miles inland from the coast. In six hours, every commonly available water source was contaminated or destroyed, every one. Yet, most of the national media focus was on New Orleans, where the failure of just two percent of the levees caused 80 percent of the damage, most of which was from flooding, not wind.
Prior to landfall, FEMA had pre-staged more assets than ever before in their history. There were two FEMA incident support teams, out of the three in the U.S.. There were ten (10) US&R teams, compared to the previous maximum of three, which were then not called upon to perform any rescues. There were over 240 trucks loaded with ice, water and food pre-staged in Louisiana and Mississippi. Within the first three days immediately following landfall, there were over 12,000 trucks of supplies. This is compared with 3,400 total during all of the 2004 hurricane season.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
40 US&R teams were eventually deployed, from 19 states, involving over 2,000 responders. There are only 28 US&R teams in the U.S., meaning some of them went more than once. These 40 teams performed 6,600 rescues, 25 percent of all the rescues in LA & MS. They spent $50M, did not have any injuries, and searched 85 miles of coastline. The first of these teams was operational within 16 hours of landfall.
The U.S. Coast Guard performed 33,544 rescues, and performed their first rescue within nine (9) hours of landfall. The National Guard performed 630 rescues in a single 16-hour period. By day 3 post- landfall, there were 70-100 aircraft over New Orleans every day.
All rescues were completed by the seventh day after landfall.
The mission assigned to the search and rescue assets was to find trapped survivors. They were not authorized to spend any time picking up bodies. US&R teams are federally activated, but work under the direction of the local police and fire departments.
Every person rescued said they should have left town, and they were stupid for staying behind. Many people were rescued from their flooded homes with one or more cars in the driveway. Some of the last people rescued had declined several previous rescue offers, and finally gave up on staying in their home.
FOOD AND WATER
The government does not deliver food and water door-to-door during normal circumstances, so why do people expect them to do it after a disaster? The only thing they have ever delivered is a tax bill.
FEMA is not an emergency service like police, fire and EMS. FEMA manages logistics by contracts. Although FEMA had staged the largest response in their history, no material is allowed to move from the staging areas until it has been requested in writing by the local or state government, and a local point of distribution (POD) is established. Following a disaster, there are few fax and phone lines available, sometimes not the proper forms, sometimes not even writing paper. Materials distributed without the proper request sometimes results in charges of misappropriation of federal funds when the post-incident audit begins. Local and state governments must have backup methods to make their resource requests.
Once PODs are established by local government, there is often not any method to notify citizens about the location of these PODs.
Only through gossip do most people learn about a POD location, and then everyone goes to the same POD at the same time. The local government did not use the operating radio stations to notify their citizens of the POD locations after they were established; something not reported by the national media. The federal government responders cannot freelance or distribute supplies without being specifically tasked to do so by the local government. The National Guard is not usually under federal control, but the state government.
STORM PREPARATION
Prior to Hurricane Wilma, the most severe storm in history, people ignored the warnings. They became complacent. Perhaps emergency management has cried wolf too many times. By all accounts, having a three-day supply of anything is grossly insufficient; 10 days is more realistic.
Nearly all communities are unprepared for spontaneous volunteers, especially those who are untrained and unequipped. They are not expected, and they do not have a mission. They do not come with food, water, a place to stay, nor communications. Unrequested supplies are called the second disaster because there are often too many supplies and too few people to manage them.
Fill a large room with hundreds of unexpected storm victims, infants, the elderly, the medically fragile. Take away the electricity, water and toilets. What are your priorities? How do you decide among life safety, search & rescue, power, food, water, ice, sanitation, hazardous materials, shelters, debris clearing, phones, public information?
These are never easy decisions, and each decision carries unexpected consequences. In Hurricane Katrina, some New Orelans nursing home managers found they could not evacuate their residents, so they stayed behind, and some died. Those managers now find themselves charged with homicide. In Hurricane Rita, Houston area nursing home managers put residents on busses, which caught on fire, and are now facing criminal charges.
Expect confusion and not ever having enough information about what is happening - situational awareness. No emergency plan can possibly cover all eventualities. Who's emergency plan would include detailed information on what to do if the space shuttle falls in their area as happened in Hemphill Texas? The plan must quickly adapt to change. Before it is needed, the plan must determine who will be in charge. You have to determine what resources are left, what communications systems remain working, how will you manage the media? How will you notify the pubic (hint: use local media, not the national people)? Will the public do what you ask them to do? (No) What is the hospital capacity? Are you flexible? Finally, you must have a plan to take care of the families of your responders.
STORM RECOVERY
Within 14 days after landfall, electric power had been restored in Mississippi to 100 percent of the buildings that could accept electric power. The MS electric power industry needed to feed 15,000-20,000 workers each day, and provide them with water and shelter. They needed a reliable source of 144,000 gallons of diesel fuel each day. They accomplished this by delegating the authority and empowering the managers to make it happen. By contrast, the US&R teams were told to use their "per diem" to pay for food, in an area without power and without any open restaurants or super markets.
This is a summary of a presentation by Tom Miner, program manager for the WA-1 Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R), given Sunday April
2 at the 2006 Communications Academy in Burien Washington. His team spent 32 days providing service during four hurricanes in 2005, beginning with Katrina. US&R and DMAT are the largest FEMA response groups.
There were seven (7) hurricanes in 2005 before Katrina, the most significant event since 2003. In just six hours, it completely devastated Mississippi. With wind gusts over 150 MPH, if it was there before the storm, it was gone afterwards. The storm surge reached up to eight (8) miles inland from the coast. In six hours, every commonly available water source was contaminated or destroyed, every one. Yet, most of the national media focus was on New Orleans, where the failure of just two percent of the levees caused 80 percent of the damage, most of which was from flooding, not wind.
Prior to landfall, FEMA had pre-staged more assets than ever before in their history. There were two FEMA incident support teams, out of the three in the U.S.. There were ten (10) US&R teams, compared to the previous maximum of three, which were then not called upon to perform any rescues. There were over 240 trucks loaded with ice, water and food pre-staged in Louisiana and Mississippi. Within the first three days immediately following landfall, there were over 12,000 trucks of supplies. This is compared with 3,400 total during all of the 2004 hurricane season.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
40 US&R teams were eventually deployed, from 19 states, involving over 2,000 responders. There are only 28 US&R teams in the U.S., meaning some of them went more than once. These 40 teams performed 6,600 rescues, 25 percent of all the rescues in LA & MS. They spent $50M, did not have any injuries, and searched 85 miles of coastline. The first of these teams was operational within 16 hours of landfall.
The U.S. Coast Guard performed 33,544 rescues, and performed their first rescue within nine (9) hours of landfall. The National Guard performed 630 rescues in a single 16-hour period. By day 3 post- landfall, there were 70-100 aircraft over New Orleans every day.
All rescues were completed by the seventh day after landfall.
The mission assigned to the search and rescue assets was to find trapped survivors. They were not authorized to spend any time picking up bodies. US&R teams are federally activated, but work under the direction of the local police and fire departments.
Every person rescued said they should have left town, and they were stupid for staying behind. Many people were rescued from their flooded homes with one or more cars in the driveway. Some of the last people rescued had declined several previous rescue offers, and finally gave up on staying in their home.
FOOD AND WATER
The government does not deliver food and water door-to-door during normal circumstances, so why do people expect them to do it after a disaster? The only thing they have ever delivered is a tax bill.
FEMA is not an emergency service like police, fire and EMS. FEMA manages logistics by contracts. Although FEMA had staged the largest response in their history, no material is allowed to move from the staging areas until it has been requested in writing by the local or state government, and a local point of distribution (POD) is established. Following a disaster, there are few fax and phone lines available, sometimes not the proper forms, sometimes not even writing paper. Materials distributed without the proper request sometimes results in charges of misappropriation of federal funds when the post-incident audit begins. Local and state governments must have backup methods to make their resource requests.
Once PODs are established by local government, there is often not any method to notify citizens about the location of these PODs.
Only through gossip do most people learn about a POD location, and then everyone goes to the same POD at the same time. The local government did not use the operating radio stations to notify their citizens of the POD locations after they were established; something not reported by the national media. The federal government responders cannot freelance or distribute supplies without being specifically tasked to do so by the local government. The National Guard is not usually under federal control, but the state government.
STORM PREPARATION
Prior to Hurricane Wilma, the most severe storm in history, people ignored the warnings. They became complacent. Perhaps emergency management has cried wolf too many times. By all accounts, having a three-day supply of anything is grossly insufficient; 10 days is more realistic.
Nearly all communities are unprepared for spontaneous volunteers, especially those who are untrained and unequipped. They are not expected, and they do not have a mission. They do not come with food, water, a place to stay, nor communications. Unrequested supplies are called the second disaster because there are often too many supplies and too few people to manage them.
Fill a large room with hundreds of unexpected storm victims, infants, the elderly, the medically fragile. Take away the electricity, water and toilets. What are your priorities? How do you decide among life safety, search & rescue, power, food, water, ice, sanitation, hazardous materials, shelters, debris clearing, phones, public information?
These are never easy decisions, and each decision carries unexpected consequences. In Hurricane Katrina, some New Orelans nursing home managers found they could not evacuate their residents, so they stayed behind, and some died. Those managers now find themselves charged with homicide. In Hurricane Rita, Houston area nursing home managers put residents on busses, which caught on fire, and are now facing criminal charges.
Expect confusion and not ever having enough information about what is happening - situational awareness. No emergency plan can possibly cover all eventualities. Who's emergency plan would include detailed information on what to do if the space shuttle falls in their area as happened in Hemphill Texas? The plan must quickly adapt to change. Before it is needed, the plan must determine who will be in charge. You have to determine what resources are left, what communications systems remain working, how will you manage the media? How will you notify the pubic (hint: use local media, not the national people)? Will the public do what you ask them to do? (No) What is the hospital capacity? Are you flexible? Finally, you must have a plan to take care of the families of your responders.
STORM RECOVERY
Within 14 days after landfall, electric power had been restored in Mississippi to 100 percent of the buildings that could accept electric power. The MS electric power industry needed to feed 15,000-20,000 workers each day, and provide them with water and shelter. They needed a reliable source of 144,000 gallons of diesel fuel each day. They accomplished this by delegating the authority and empowering the managers to make it happen. By contrast, the US&R teams were told to use their "per diem" to pay for food, in an area without power and without any open restaurants or super markets.